



The Pan-European Outlook

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Source: *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (Sep., 1931), pp. 638-651

Published by: [Wiley](#) on behalf of the [Royal Institute of International Affairs](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3016059>

Accessed: 26-02-2016 11:25 UTC

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THE PAN-EUROPEAN OUTLOOK

Address given at Chatham House on June 4th, 1931

By COUNT RICHARD COUDENHOVE-KALERGI

THE RT. HON. L. S. AMERY, M.P., in the Chair.

I THINK it is a fact that the world in this twentieth century is getting over the idea of nationalism on a narrow basis, and is still not yet sufficiently organised to create the real universal State. Between the "national" period of humanity and the period that will come one day of the organisation of the whole world as a single federation of States, we must pass through a "continental" period, a time when narrow national patriotism changes into patriotism for large areas of the world. One illustration of this is the movement for patriotism for the British Empire, another is the movement for Pan-Europe. So I think it is quite natural that these two feelings and these two movements should work together, with friendly understanding one for the other; just as in the middle of the last century there was cooperation between the great movement for the union of all the German States and the movement for the union of the Italian States, each finding friendship and understanding in the other and realising their national ideal at nearly the same time.

Another instance of what I have called the "continental" period is that not only are the Pan-European and the British Commonwealth ideas struggling side by side, but there is also a third idea in the Pan-American movement that is tending to organise the Republics of the American continent in some kind of federation to secure peace in the New World. Now, I think these three movements ought to work together for peace, for international cooperation, and for the development of the League of Nations.

I want to give you precise reasons for the importance of the Pan-European movement. The motives are threefold; there are three reasons why cooperation in Europe has become necessary. One of the reasons is to prevent war; the second is to prevent economic ruin; the third is to defend Europe from the Bolshevik danger. For each of these reasons alone, Pan-Europe would be necessary. If there existed only the war danger and Pan-Europe

would prevent a war, we ought all to work for Pan-Europe. If it were only the economic danger and the necessity for large markets in Europe, for the abolition of customs barriers and for a free-trade movement in Europe, we should work for it. Also the third reason alone would make a Pan-European movement necessary—to cooperate against this common danger to Western civilisation.

The problem of Pan-Europe is how it is to be realised. We can create Pan-Europe by creating a new public opinion, by showing the European a new ideal and common interests. The Pan-European movement is so strong because it is based not only on ideals but also on interests; just as the British Empire movement is strong because it is based on both ideals and interests—walking on two feet.

The great aim of the Pan-European movement is to make European boundaries invisible, as the frontier is now between England and Scotland. We are working to make European frontiers invisible in three ways: from the military point of view, by European federation; from the economic point of view, by European free trade or a European customs union; from the national point of view, by a real protection of minorities and real equality between the nations of Europe. If the frontiers become invisible in these three respects, we shall have peace and prosperity in Europe and we shall be able to defend our Western civilisation.

The great problem is how Pan-Europe will modify the organisation of the world and what influence it will have on the organisation of the League of Nations. I think we must go back to the time when the League of Nations was founded. At that time the whole world seemed likely to become a single system. Germany became a democratic State and Russia was just becoming Bolshevik, which most people thought was a transitory phase which would be followed by a democratic monarchy. Since then things have changed very much. We have seen in Russia the birth of a new system, very different from that of Western civilisation. We see that the world has moved not towards union but towards disunion; that the Eastern civilisations have discontinued trying to adopt Western civilisation, but are trying to renew their ancient civilisations or to found new forms for their old traditions.

We see that the great idea of forming the League of Nations has not succeeded, for the United States did not enter it, Mexico did not enter it, and Brazil has left it. The three greatest Republics of the American continent do not take part in the League. And, on the other hand, the largest State of the Old World, the

Soviet Federation, did not enter the League either. Thus the League of Nations is actually formed by the States of the British Commonwealth, the States of Europe, some of the Oriental States, and some of the smaller Latin American States. That is the actual situation.

The only organised part of the League of Nations is the British Commonwealth. That has its proper organisation and has organised a quarter of humanity and a quarter of the globe. Of the other parts of the League of Nations, the Latin American States have not formed an organisation for themselves, but are part of the Pan-American organisation, the second great organisation in the world, which is only fifty years old and is still at the beginning of its evolution, watching to see how Pan-Europe develops. In Eastern Asia, you have first of all Japan and China, and those two States will one day find some form of collaboration. The Manchurian problem is so difficult because Japan needs Manchuria for economic reasons, and China needs it for political reasons. Therefore there will either be a war over Manchuria or some kind of federation. I think all lovers of peace and friends of human progress must hope that the form taken will be that of federation between those two States. Possibly the form that Great Britain is seeking to find in India will indicate the direction in which China and Japan can find understanding.

We also see the Soviets, who form a great part of the world, creating a federation which is very hostile to the League of Nations, so that the League cannot assume the position of representing the world. It represents only part of the world and not the whole world. The great mistake was to form the League on the model of the United States of America and not on the model of the British Empire. The British Commonwealth is not a federation of States but a federation of federations. In the same sense, the League of Nations ought to be, not a federation of States, as it actually is, but a federation of federations. That is the reason for the great importance and necessity of revising the League of Nations Covenant. I am sure that Pan-Europe will work out in that sense.

The first step has been taken by M. Briand in creating a European Union in the framework of the League of Nations. I think one consequence of this step will be that the States of South America will not remain in the League of Nations on its present basis. They will argue that they have no interest in being summoned to the League of Nations in the month of

September to make speeches and to do practically nothing else, while the important problems are settled in a European Committee. Either they will get out, as Brazil did, or else they will say: "We have some right to form an American section of the League of Nations, just as Europe is forming a European section, and as the British Empire forms a British section." And so they will decide to open some office in Montevideo or some other town, and will say: "This office is now the South American Section of the League of Nations, where we shall decide our own affairs, just as Europeans decide theirs." They would be entirely right, but I think the United States of America would not permit Latin America to form its own organisation outside the Pan-American Union. They would not admit of a Latin-American Federation formed under the auspices of the League of Nations, that is to say, allied with the British Empire and Pan-Europe and even with Eastern Asia, in the League of Nations and outside the United States.

But what could the United States do in practice to prevent this evolution? The only thing would be to get into touch with the League of Nations, to propose a change in the Covenant and to get the acceptance of the whole of the Pan-American Union as an autonomous and independent branch of the League of Nations. That will probably be the evolution, and it is possible, if the League of Nations changes its system and becomes, after the model of the British Commonwealth, a federation of federations, based on the five great parts of the world—the British Commonwealth, Pan-America, Pan-Europe, Eastern Asia, and the Soviet Union. For, if the future peace of the world is based on these five groups, it is certain that the Soviets would also enter into the League of Nations as an independent federation of federated groups, without the feeling that Europe would interfere with Russia's affairs or that Russia would interfere with Europe's affairs.

I think it was a great fault to invite Russia to take part in the European Committee at Geneva, and the effect was to paralyse the Committee's work. I have no faith that Pan-Europe will come out of the European Committee at Geneva now; it will become a platform of discussion between capitalist and Bolshevik systems and no place in which to work for the organisation of Europe. Europe will have to be organised in another way. I think collaboration between the Soviet Unions and the rest of the world would be a very good thing, under the condition that the Soviets did not want to run all over the world with their ideas,

and with the guarantee that Europe would not try to interfere to overthrow the Government in Russia. And if an attempt were made to adapt the League of Nations as a system of federations, a system of organised balance of Power between these two communities, I think Russia would enter, and we should really have the nucleus of a federation of the world. That is what the League of Nations is pretending to be but is not in reality.

The organisation of the League would change in that the League of Nations Council would become representative of these great entities; the Assembly would be divided into the British Commonwealth Conference, the Conference of the Soviets, the European Conference, the Conference between China and Japan, and the Pan-American Conference; and at the top we should have the League of Nations as a moral influence and as the arbiter between these great parts of the world.

But I do not think that this ideal system of federations would immediately result from the establishment of Pan-Europe; there is an intermediate step which we must take if we want to organise the world. This step is a collaboration between the three great groups of humanity represented by the British Commonwealth, Pan-America and Pan-Europe—between the three great Atlantic Powers—to organise a close cooperation to save Western civilisation from the great dangers that are now threatening it. This great aim would be centralised in the British Commonwealth, because it is the natural bridge between Europe and America—linked with the United States by language and through Canada and with Europe by history and by contiguity—serving as a great means towards the peace of the world. Collaboration between Europe and America is the essential basis of all practical peace politics.

The attitude of British public opinion towards this Pan-European plan varies greatly. Some people think that Pan-Europe ought to be prevented because it will involve a deviation from the traditional principles of British politics directed against the formation of any great European empire. That is true. Great Britain ought to prevent any Power on the Continent from creating an empire under its hegemony; it would be a danger for her. But the great difference is that in former centuries there existed only the British Isles and the continent of Europe—the rest of the world having no importance for British politics. In the twentieth century, however, Great Britain has become the British Empire, an intercontinental world Power, and on the other side there is not only Europe, but a series of States in the world—the

United States, the Soviet Union, Japan. What the European balance of power formerly was for Great Britain, the world balance of power now is for the British Empire. And just as it was necessary to keep the balance of power in Europe in former centuries, so it will now be necessary to keep the balance of power in the world, to prevent any one part of the world from obtaining hegemony over another.

I think Great Britain has every interest in the union of Europe and in the safeguarding of the peace of Europe so that she may not again be drawn into new European wars. It is to her interest that Europe should become prosperous with a large market for the products of the British Empire, especially for the raw materials of the Empire that Europe cannot produce. It is to her interest that Europe should defend the British Empire from the common danger from Russia, for Europe is the wall that separates Great Britain from Russia; and that Eastern Europe and Germany should be prevented from falling into the arms of Russia or becoming one day part of the Soviet Federation, with the result that the Soviet Empire would stretch to the North Sea and the Channel. I think all these reasons ought to bring British politics into a direction neither antagonistic nor neutral towards Europe, but to help us in our organisation.

All Pan-Europeans are friends of the idea of the British Empire. They are friends of Great Britain because they know that she wants peace. They want a closer collaboration with her. Many of them wish that Great Britain would enter as a member of Pan-Europe. The French hope for this because they are afraid of standing alone in Europe with Germany and Italy. The Germans hope for it because they are afraid of standing alone with France and Italy. Many European States hope for it, and I too would hope for it if I could see it was practical. But I think the fact of Great Britain being a member of the European Federation would have the same subtle influence on that Federation as was exercised by the membership of the Habsburg Monarchy in the German Federation. It prevented the union of Germany for two generations because Austria had so many interests outside Germany that she could not become a member of the Federation in practice. She stayed with one leg in the German Federation but prevented the Federation from becoming an empire.

I think there are certainly some statesmen in Great Britain who hope that she will do the same thing in Europe, and keep a foot in the European Federation, not to help it on but to prevent it from developing in the Pan-European sense. I think it is

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much better for Europe, the British Empire and the world that the relations should be made clear between the European continent and the British Empire, if we see on what lines and in what respects we must cooperate, and in what respects our interests are different, and if we can get the British Empire and Europe together in the great framework of Atlantic brotherhood and Western civilisation and a concrete League of Nations. On this all the hope of humanity rests.

So I appeal to you. Please help us in our work. It is very difficult and the obstacles are enormous. Help us to unite ourselves; help us to keep peace in Europe, to disarm, to get back prosperity, and to defend our civilisation. Help us in the same way that France helped Italy to unite in the nineteenth century. The British Empire can take that attitude towards European union, or it can take the attitude that France took towards German union. The fact that France helped Italy to unite had such a moral influence that, even a generation later, Italy did not join with Germany and Austria, perhaps because she did not forget that France had helped her in a critical phase of her history. On the other hand, may not the bad relations that have existed between France and Germany for two generations arise from the fact that France tried to prevent German union?

I hope and am sure that Great Britain will help. I am sure that Great Britain, who wants, more than any State of the world, peace and prosperity and understanding between the various parts of the world, will understand Europe and help her to unite. I am quite sure that the relations between Great Britain and Europe will be the same as now exist between Canada and the United States of America; that just as it is impossible to conceive of war between Canada and the United States, so it will be impossible to conceive of a war between Europe and Great Britain. It is of the greatest importance to create this feeling of brotherhood and friendship between these parts of the world, and so to prepare the way for our great aim of the future federation of humanity.

Summary of Discussion.

THE CHAIRMAN, MR. AMERY, in introducing the speaker, said that, although Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was still a young man, he had already made history, not as an active politician, but as the prophet of an idea—the idea of a common European patriotism, in the light of which causes of bitterness and weakness might disappear. The Pan-European movement, of which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was the leader, started in 1923 and had shown a remarkable growth,

influencing Europe far more than was realised in Great Britain. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi had influenced, through personal contact, many of Europe's leading statesmen—Dr. Stresemann, Dr. Beneš, and M. Briand—and there could be no doubt that the scheme for European Union, launched by M. Briand in 1929, was initiated and influenced by him. Although that scheme met with a mixed reception, the general conception underlying it was working all the time, strengthened by various factors : by the gravity of the general economic depression, by the growing fear in Europe of the political and economic consequences of the Soviet Five-Year Plan, and by the recent excitement over the Austro-German Customs Union. Both in Czechoslovakia and in France the answer to that proposed Union had been the suggestion that it would be incompatible with the development of European economic unity.

There was a tendency to regard the Pan-European movement as superfluous, because the League of Nations was considered as competent to do all that this movement aimed at, and it was even looked upon in some quarters as mischievous, in distracting forces which were working for the same ends. He considered this a mistake. Undoubtedly the objects were the same—peace and a better organisation of the world—but the field was not the same, and the methods and psychology were essentially different. The whole basis of the conception of the League of Nations was, in a sense, negative and—saying this without disparagement—mechanical, in so far as it aimed at preventing war by the particular method of conference. Its character was abstract, and it dealt with nations at large, without distinctions of race or locality and without recognising any groupings of such nations, except tacitly in the case of the British Empire.

The conception for which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi stood was a concrete one. It stood for an emotional patriotism concentrated on Europe as a definite geographical, cultural, and historical entity. In the light of that patriotism it was hoped that existing patriotisms, in so far as they were sources of friction and war, would be sterilised for mischief, while continuing their existence for good. That aspect convinced him that, within its limited field, the Pan-European idea was calculated to be infinitely more powerful for peace than the League of Nations. Indeed, he saw no chance of the League of Nations being able to preserve the peace of nations so long as the basis of patriotism remained what it was in Europe.

But, while the conception of Pan-Europe in that sense differed fundamentally from the conception of the League of Nations, there was nothing in it in any way incompatible with the development of the work of the League. Just as the British Empire had done much to support and encourage the League of Nations in its early days, so Pan-Europe could play its part in helping the League to do its work, by separating out purely European causes of friction, thus making the League more truly universal and easier for the United States to join.

The British Empire could not but welcome and encourage such a

movement. But Britain could not become an actual member of a united Europe without doing an irreparable injury both to the British Empire and to Europe itself. It was not possible to have two patriotisms in opposite directions. It was perfectly possible for Great Britain to sympathise with and help forward Pan-Europe, to encourage close relations between the British Empire and a Greater Europe, and to act as an interpreter between the United Europe and the United States of America, developing to the utmost all cultural and spiritual contacts with Europe; but British interests and outlook were so different that, as an actual member of a United Europe, Britain would be a hindrance to the closer union of Europe and also to the development of Empire unity.

COLONEL STEVENS raised the question of a common international currency. He said that it was considered that a common currency throughout the British Empire would be impossible because of freight and transport charges, etc. He suggested, however, as a constructive idea for the Pan-European movement, that there should be a common currency for Europe, over and above the national currency of each country. In his business dealings with Belgium and Spain he realised the practical need for this. It had been impossible for him to arrange a contract with a company in Spain because the peseta had fallen so much during the past month that no contract prices could be arranged. The effect of some sort of international note, which could not be used by Governments for paying their debts, but which might be bought by trading concerns from banks and used for purely commercial purposes, would be that instead of having to consider the exchange of two countries, traders would only have to take the exchange of one country into consideration.

COUNT COUDENHOVE-KALERGI replied that the proposition was very interesting and was considered a great deal by the Pan-Europeans. The project in the minds of many of its leaders was to have a common currency in Europe, such as the gold gramme, for international purposes, while keeping marks or francs, etc., for internal purposes, just as Belgium had the belga for external purposes and the franc for internal.

QUESTION: Why was it necessary to exclude Britain from Pan-Europe on account of her Dominions when France had her colonial possessions, Belgium had the Congo and nearly every other European-State had interests outside Europe?

COUNT COUDENHOVE-KALERGI replied that it was a matter for the British Empire to decide. Nobody in Europe would say anything against the entry of the British Empire into the European Federation; it would bring with it great possibilities of emigration and many other advantages for Europe. But he did not think it was likely that the

Dominions would agree to it. If they had to choose between a European Federation and an Anglo-Saxon Federation, which could be crystallised round the United States, they were more likely to choose the latter.

MR. A. YUSUF ALI said that the idea of Pan-Europe was very fascinating, but he would like to have heard more details of how the scheme was to be worked. If Great Britain and the British Empire were excluded and if Russia was excluded, a great deal of the attraction and working chances of the idea would be removed. He agreed with the Chairman that it was improbable that the British Empire, with its footing in all the continents, would join the European Federation, but would not Great Britain's absence make the Federation practically inert? In the League of Nations, Great Britain, although theoretically just one of the fifty-two nations, exercised a very powerful influence for peace and for the international solution of many intricate questions. As representing India at Geneva when the Conservative Government was in power, he had felt with pride that the British Empire was in the position of arbitrator in the League; Mr. Henderson's work also showed that the fact of his being the British Foreign Minister, apart from his own personal ability, had enabled some nasty corners to be cleared in recent international politics. He therefore felt that Pan-Europe without Great Britain would lack one of the greatest elements that would make for its success. It therefore seemed to him a strong argument against attempting its formation.

He referred to the lecturer's picture of Russia as a separate entity in the larger federation of federations, on even terms with the British Empire, Pan-Europe and Pan-America, with some sort of Asiatic federation. At present the state of Asiatic politics was one of complete chaos, and Russia was so inextricably bound up economically with Germany, Poland, and the Succession States of Austria, that the exclusion of Russia would create as great difficulties as the exclusion of Britain. The practical scheme seemed impossible with the two biggest factors in European politics left out.

With regard to the three objects for establishing Pan-Europe—to prevent war, to prevent economic misery, to counteract the effect of Russian propaganda—the organisation of a group of States in Europe which, without the outlying areas, would be Mittel-Europa in another form was likely to stimulate such fissions as already existed in European politics. Spain, Italy and the Balkans were on the fringe, and the real centre of gravity lay in the politics associated with the relations of France and Germany, with the possibility of the *Anschluss*, and with the Little Entente. In introducing the idea of balance, although the ideal was peace, the effect would be against peace. From the economic point of view, if Pan-Europe was to become a reality, it would only do so because of common economic interests; but did such common economic interests exist? Were the interests of Spain the same as those of Germany? Were the interests of the agrarian States

the same as the interests of the manufacturing States? If the interests, though different, were complementary it would be an argument for federation. But the whole difficulty in Central and South-Eastern Europe lay in the fact that the agrarian countries, though they wished to have markets for their raw materials in the manufacturing countries, did not want to become dumping grounds for manufactured goods from other countries. They did their own manufacturing, and as long as this position continued it would be extremely difficult to work out a real federation on a satisfactory basis. For the moment he left out the differences of temperament, outlook and history, but they were also important. France was almost as extra-European as Britain. Italy had possessions and ambitions in Africa. Holland's East Indies were almost more to her than India to Britain. Pan-Europe as a compact unity was only conceivable if these outside interests were lopped off. But would any Pan-European even contemplate such truncation? Surely it was better to work for tariff understandings within the Briand Plan under the League of Nations.

The third reason given for Pan-Europe was the danger from Russia; but the reason why Russian propaganda was dangerous to England or to France was not that it was likely to appeal to the man in the street in England or France, but because of discontents in the East and in parts of Europe, which created an atmosphere in which any system, however absurd, was likely to obtain a lodgment. His own country of India had been subject to that kind of propaganda and he knew that its efficacy was not due to its intrinsic merits, but to its playing upon existing discontents. Russia wanted to get at England and France through their colonies and to make mischief in the world, because Communism was not merely a state system but a whole complex of economic, moral and ethical ideas. If Russia was included in the federation, the door would be open to that type of insidious propaganda, and instead of being content to exist side by side as a separate federation, the Soviet Federation would inevitably try to undermine its neighbours and the very basis of peace would be endangered. These were all strong reasons against giving support to the Pan-European movement.

COUNT COUDENHOVE-KALERGI replied that the problem of whether Great Britain should enter Pan-Europe was a British problem, not a European problem. Pan-Europe would have a place for Great Britain if she wished to take it, just as the first Constitution of the United States had left a place open for Canada, but as long as England was head of a federation which covered a quarter of humanity and was greater than the whole of Europe together, he did not think she would take that place. But Pan-Europe was possible without Great Britain. If in the future Great Britain did not succeed in building up the Empire the situation would be changed; just as Austria, in the first instance, solved her problem by remaining outside the German Empire, but, when the Habsburg Monarchy ceased to exist, had to face the problem

under altered circumstances, so Great Britain might wish to enter Pan-Europe and the other Anglo-Saxon Powers might try to prevent her *Anschluss* with Europe.

The Russian problem was different. Pan-Europe would be on a basis of close friendship with the United Kingdom and the British Empire, regardless of the way in which they were related to the Continent, but Russia was quite out of touch with Europe. Russia was the only island that still existed in the world. Europe was far more closely connected with Australia than with Russia, and the barriers that did not exist geographically were deeper than the Atlantic Ocean between Europe and the United States of America.

It was essential to see the difference between national problems, continental problems, and world problems. He was sure the British Empire had done a great deal for the peace of Europe and the world. The fact that Mr. Henderson had accepted the presidency of the Disarmament Conference must be applauded by the whole world, and would certainly help it towards reaching a practical result. But world problems must be separated from European problems, and it could not be said that the part of the British Empire in guarding its own interests always worked out on the side of European peace. Great Britain had refused its consent to the Protocol of Geneva because it could not undertake the guarantee for the peace of Europe and of its world-wide Empire, and this had prevented the greatest step towards peace in Europe that the League of Nations ever tried to realise. On the question of inter-European preference, undoubtedly a step towards European economic collaboration and peace, Great Britain again took a separate attitude from that of the Continental Powers, because it could not at the same time enter into a preferential system in Europe and in the Empire.

On the other hand, Great Britain as a State outside Europe, with sympathies and interests in all parts of the world, would be able to play the part of umpire in many European difficulties and would make for European understanding, just as it played an enormous rôle in world economic problems and world disarmament problems.

On other points Count Coudenhove-Kalergi said that the chief obstacle to free intercourse between individuals of different nationality in Europe was the existence of language barriers. This obstacle could only be overcome by teaching in all the schools of Europe a second language, and the best language for this purpose was English, as it was the only existing language which had a chance of becoming a world language. It was already the language used in Eastern Asia for communication between Chinese, Japanese and Indians, and its use would do more than any political treaty to promote understanding between Great Britain and the Continent and between Europe and America. The British Empire and America could work for this idea if they would give immigration preference to all those nations in the world which introduced English into their elementary schools. The

adoption of English as the common international language in Europe would be easier if Great Britain were not a member of Pan-Europe and so a rival, in that respect, of France or Germany. He was not a believer in an artificial language such as Esperanto.

With regard to the Soviet Union, he did not think it was possible or desirable for Europe to overthrow the system in Russia, but it would be a great misfortune if it spread to Europe, not merely for economic reasons, but because the system was incompatible with the European idea of liberty. It was possible for a country as rich as Russia to work on that scale; the capitalistic system was not the only system that was possible in the world; but the Russian system was practically slavery. The choice was between equality and liberty. If Europe chose liberty she must renounce equality; if she chose equality she must renounce liberty. Russia had chosen one, but the great part of the world had chosen the other. He thought it was possible for the two systems to go on existing near each other, but he did not believe that Russian promises not to make propaganda would be sufficient guarantee for the peace of the world. Even though propaganda were not made officially, it would continue unofficially, because Communism was not only a state system but also a new form of religion, like Islam in its day, and it wanted to conquer the world for its idea. A generation was growing up in Russia with a hatred for all the rest of the world and thinking that the whole world would become Communist. Europe could only be safeguarded by treaties and by sufficient power to prevent Russia from attacking Europe. If the American States were not united but all living in rivalry there would certainly have been a Mexican danger; the existence of the United States, with a common army, was a stronger guarantee for peace between the United States and Mexico than any treaties would be. The same was true in Eastern Europe. As long as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, were all independent States with no guarantee for their boundaries, it was probable that one day Russia would try to overthrow them and to unite them with the Soviet Union of Republics. If those States were part of a European Federation and their rights were protected by European power, then Russia would certainly not try to enter Europe, and peace between Europe and Russia would be safeguarded. It would then be possible to have mutual disarmament and even economic and political cooperation between the two countries, just as there were negotiations and cooperation between Islamic and Christian civilisations. The guarantee would be the power of Europe and the will of Europe to maintain peace.

THE CHAIRMAN, MR. AMERY, in conclusion, said that Count Coudenhove-Kalergi was working not for some particular machinery, but for a definite and concrete idea based on evolution. The idea of the British Empire was just such an idea, giving its own character of unity to the British Empire.

The unity of Europe was of a different kind. It was easily visible

when one entered the sphere of the arts and of religion. There was also a great deal of historic unity. The conception which dated from the Roman Empire had never entirely died out. It had been the dream of the Middle Ages, for the sake of which Germany had been sacrificed by the Emperors, for the sake of which Europe went to the Crusades. And always Britain had been a little outside that unity, claiming a separate imperial status. It had been the dream of Henri IV. of France. Napoleon had tried to realise it in a crude form. Historically, culturally and ethically, the unity of Europe was a real unity, temporarily obliterated in later centuries by religious divisions and the conception of linguistic patriotisms. If these narrow patriotisms could be weakened by a common European patriotism, the underlying central conditions of unity would reappear. But the unity must not embrace too much or it would not hold together. If England and the British Empire were included it would bring in a whole set of different ideas and interests. From the economic point of view in the British Empire there was firstly the highly industrial mother-country, then the Dominions, developing industry but still primarily agricultural, and then the tropical colonies, while India was developing industry as well as producing tropical products. In Europe there was the north-west, essentially industrial, and the south-east, primarily agricultural. The more they worked together the less would the forces of industry be directed to national ends and the more would Western capital flow into South-Eastern Europe for the development of agriculture, and the common resources of Europe could be employed to develop Europe's great African territories. With these territories Pan-Europe would form a unity, capable of living for itself, just as much as could be said of the British Empire or of Pan-America, and far more than could be said of the Far East or of Soviet Russia.

With regard to these larger units, nobody contemplated that they should be shut off from each other by Chinese walls, either economically or spiritually. The conception for which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi stood was not one of deepening divisions or raising barriers but for reducing their numbers. The abolishing of barriers within Europe and within the British Empire did not mean that the barriers between Europe and the British Empire would become higher. On the contrary, these greater units would have increasing intercourse with one another. The greatest danger to the peace of Europe came from the irredentisms. If they were eliminated the Russian problem would still remain, and friction would be possible between the British Empire and the United States or between Europe and the British Empire, but the number of friction surfaces would be reduced and the spirit of toleration and cooperation which made the larger units possible would also lessen the possibilities of friction between those units. In this way Pan-Europe would make its contribution to the peace of the world.